[Oman-l] Understanding the current Israeli-Palestinian fighting

[BaaboodA@aol.com]

Here is an excellent article explaining the recent break out of hostilities 
in the Middle East. Given the recent interest and exchange on this subject on 
the list I thought that the article could throw further light on this 
specific issue from a peace-loving Israeli view point. It's definitely worth 
a read.

Abdulla



Subj:    Negotiating the Settlements  The Success of Right-Wing Political 
Entrapment Against Peace
Date:   01/11/00 23:19:04 GMT Standard Time
From:   peace@netvision.net.il (Gershon Baskin)


Negotiating the Settlements  The Success of Right-Wing Political Entrapment
Against Peace

Gershon Baskin, Ph.D.

 The Israeli media reported that Ehud Barak made the most “generous offer” 
the
Palestinians could ever expect to receive from an Israeli Prime Minster.
Furthermore, the Israeli hasbara  (propaganda) machine blamed Arafat for “not
missing the opportunity to miss another opportunity”. Mr. Barak claimed that
the Palestinians didn’t even offer a counter offer or even respond to the
Israeli offer.  A central part of the Israeli “package” of offers included, 
as
reported by Zeev Schiff in Haaretz, was 90% of the West Bank  the remaining
10%
to be annexed to Israel.  Mr. Barak claimed that he would receive the support
of the majority of settlers because 80% would remain where they are and would
be under Israel sovereignty. Only some 40,000 settlers would have to relocate
into the so-called “settlement blocs” that would be annexed.  Sounds almost
reasonable. Yet the Palestinian rejection was swift and firm and in fact,
served as one of the primary motivating forces that led to the intensity of
the
“al-Aqsa intifida”.

 Palestinians who were at Camp David speak about a new concept in the
Israeli-Palestinian lexicon that was born “up on the hill” with the help of
planners and map experts brought in to interpret the positions and problems
presented by both sides. The new concept is: settlement clusters.  As opposed
to “settlement blocs”  concentrated Israeli settlements alongside the Green
Line which could be annexed to the pre-1967 borders, the concept of
“settlement
clusters” refers to groups of more isolated settlements in the heart of the
Palestinian territories becoming islands of Israeli sovereignty once
annexed by
Israel.  The Israeli 90% - 10% offer to the Palestinians included a number of
these settlement clusters. This reality also meant that about 40 Palestinian
villages with about 80,000 Palestinians would also be annexed to Israel.  The
Palestinian’s top urban planner was rushed to Camp David by Arafat to
interpret
the Israeli offer that the Americans were pressuring the Palestinians to
accept.  The Americans and the Israelis told the Palestinians that this was
the
best possible offer and that Barak had done the maximum.  Barak, they
explained, would have to withdraw more than 40 settlements and more than
40,000
settlers.  Any additional compromise would bring down his government and then
“Arafat can negotiate with Sharon and Bibi”.

 In Palestinian eyes, the Barak offer created not islands of Israeli
sovereignty but a series of at least three Palestinian “sovereign cages”.
There
would be no real Palestinian territorial contiguity.  They would not have
control and sovereignty on main arteries of transportation.  The Jordan Valley
would still be controlled by the IDF  even if the Palestinians were granted
some kind of control there. The only part of the Israeli proposal that seemed
acceptable to the Palestinians was their understanding that Barak was willing
to remove all of the settlements from Gaza, including Gush Katif, however, it
was not clear whether Barak was willing to “allow” the Palestinians to have a
sovereign border crossing with Egypt in Rafah. (After Camp David it became
less
clear whether in fact Barak had actually offered to remove all of the Gaza
settlements  where they still control about 30% of the Gaza Strip).

 Throughout the negotiations the Palestinians constantly reminded themselves,
the Americans and the Israelis that according to Oslo the agreement signed in
Washington in September 1995, Israel was supposed to implement further
redeployment of its forces (and control) to “specified military locations”. 
The mutual Israeli-Palestinian understanding of this at that time included the
Israeli settlements within the definition of “specified military locations”. 
According to the Palestinians, by the end of the interim period (5 years)
Israel should have withdrawn from 90% of the West Bank  based on a signed and
endorsed agreement. The Palestinians believed that the area of the settlements
included only the built up areas  allowing for a perimeter of 50 meters from
the last home in each settlement.  This together with IDF bases would
amount to
about 10% of the West Bank.  However, an argument then emerged when Benyamin
Netanyahu was Prime Minister.  Israel then claimed that the agreement referred
to “security zones” and not “specified military locations”  a much broader
definition allowing Israel to decide unilaterally that the further
redeployments would be much less than the Palestinian demands.  Netanyahu’s
office produced a Hebrew version of the Oslo Agreement talking about “azorim
bitchoniim”  security zones.  At the same time, the Israeli Foreign Ministry
produced an internal document labeled “Secret  Limited Distribution” with the
correct translation of the term “specified military locations” claiming that
the Palestinian interpretation was the correct version.

 Mr. Barak decided even before being elected that he would “merge” the third
further redeployment with the final status agreement and thereby avoid making
unnecessary concessions to the Palestinians. In other words  there would be no
further redeployment that the Palestinians expected to include at least 50% of
the West Bank.  Barak believed that after Netanyahu, his “generous” offer
would
be viewed by the Palestinians as their version of getting their state “on a
silver platter”. The Palestinian refusal was incomprehensible  how could they
refuse?  Who will possibly give them a better deal?

 The Palestinians have claimed since Oslo in 1993 that they had made their
“historic compromise” by giving up 78% of Palestine  leaving them with only
the
West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza.  They believed that Israel would make
their
“historic compromise” in the final status negotiations when they withdraw 
from
100% of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza  allowing for minor border
rectification and taking into account some of the new realities on the
ground. 
Taking into account some of the “new realities” led Arafat to offer Barak
2% of
the West Bank “for free” and another 2% in exchange for territory of equal
size
and quality inside of Israel. The Palestinians’ position has been based on
their demand to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 (according to
their understanding) meaning a full Israeli withdrawal from all territories
conquered in 1967.  Arafat’s agreement to give up 2% “for free” led to a deep
rift within the Palestinian delegation.  Unofficial reports even spoke of a
“fist fight” that broke out between at least 2 of the delegates from the
Palestinian team.  If this was the height of the intensity of dissatisfaction
within the Palestinian delegation, then it should have been taken for granted
by Israel and the Americans that the Palestinian public would “explode” at 
the
notion of having to “take it or leave it” with regard to the Israel 
“generous”
offer.  

 In public opinion surveys conducted amongst Palestinian following Camp David
it was found that the highest level of dissatisfaction and anger by the
Palestinian public was demonstrated with regard to the territorial issue and
the settlement issue.  The Palestinians have seen the rapid expansion of
settlements and roads during the past 17 months of the Barak government.  For
Palestinians, the reality of settlements means being in perpetual occupation 
the idea of political separation becomes little more than a farce.  
 
 The Israeli peace camp always objected to the building of settlements.  From
the very beginning of the settlement movement the peace camp in Israel was out
on the streets protesting.  I remember tens of those demonstrations  the most
dramatic of them  for me  being the demonstration in Efrat on a cold rainy
Saturday before the first person had even moved in.  The reality of the amount
of money, roads, infrastructure and houses built was impossible to ignore.  I
remember saying “we’re carrying signs and they’re building”  what a feeling 
of
impotence!  The Israeli left knew that the settlements were and obstacle to
peace  even the Americans said so. So why then, did the peace camp adopt the
line of even “liberals” in the Likud and most center people in Labour that 
the
settlements were a reality  a fact on the ground that couldn’t be changed.
How
is that the peace camp in Israel became the “defense attorney” for the
settlers
and settlements vis-a vis the Palestinians?

 Throughout the negotiations over the years, most Israelis have accepted the
viewpoint regarding the irrelevance of international law expressed so
eloquently by Ben-Gurion “Um  schmoom”  meaning “UN  nonsense!”.  Who cares
that building settlements is a blatant breach of international law? Who cares
that the “progressive” Supreme Court of Israel has consistently rejected the
notion that it must consider international law  its mandate is only within the
framework of Israeli jurisprudence. 

 It now seems after a total break-down and perhaps permanent collapse of the
Oslo Process that the slogan “settlements means no peace” is a reality.  It
does seem almost possible to imagine any Israeli government willing to remove
more settlements than Barak offered.  The Palestinians want to replace the
Americans who blamed them for the failure of Camp David.  The desire to demand
international intervention, protection and even mediation is not tactical  it
is strategic.  They know that international law is on their side.  It seems
that their strategy also includes a Hizballah type of war of attrition on
specific isolated Israeli settlements in order to demonstrate their high cost
to Israeli interests. It is not by chance that Netzerim, Kfar Darom, Psgaot,
Kadim and Ganim have become targets during this new intifada.

 The curse of the settlements will cost Israel and Palestine peace  at least
for the foreseeable future. The religious and historical attraction of Jews to
the heart land of the West Bank  the cradle of our birth as a nation  should
not have prevented us from visiting there as welcome tourists in a Palestinian
state.  Once again it is being proven that Jewish attraction to stones is
apparently more sacred than human life and that our historic rights and
heritage is of a higher value than others and far beyond the importance of
international law. One day  perhaps, it will be written that 180,000 Jewish
settlers prevented peace for millions of Israelis and Palestinians.  How
tragic.




Gershon Baskin, Ph.D. 
Directors

Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information - IPCRI - is an
Israeli-Palestinian public policy think-tank working to advance peace between
Israel and Palestine and in the region. 

P.O. Box  9321
Jerusalem, 91092  


Office Telephone and Fax, Bethlehem - +972-2-277-6054  Fax: +972-2-277-6057
Mobile: 972-(0)52-381-715

Visit our Web Site: <http://www.ipcri.org/>http://www.ipcri.org